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Introduction 
This paper aims at elaborating social factors related to internal migration in a developing 
country, Korea. As of date, there is quite a lot of quality literature(l) which provides a 
*Assistant Professor. Department of Urban and Regional Planning. Graduate School of 
Environmental Studies. Seoul National University. 
**Prepared for the meeting on the indicators of social factors of development. sponsored by 
UNESCO and held in Madrid. Spain. 9-12 June. 1980. 
(1) Two authors in the literature are distinct: Findley (1977) and Shaw (1975). 
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good overview of the current state of knowledge concerning internal migration in a com-
prehensive and appropriate manner. This literature pays greater attention to internal mig-
ration in developing countries. For this reason, the discussion in this paper is confined to 
recent Korean experience. And social factors will be taken in a l::>roader sense, that is, as 
societal one in that they may cover social, economic, cultural and psychological aspects. 
This is so because social aspects are closely interlocked with other sectoral elements. 
This study will be made primarily on the basis of a literature survey covering qualitative 
reports as well as ra~ data such as population census. In this paper, internal migration 
is defined as the mobility of people between regions, which differs from residential mobility 
which happens within cities or urban areas. Furthermore, migration is conceived as imply-
ing socio-economic mobility. This point can be justified in the sense that urban-rural 
migration in the geographical sense is more likely to refer to job transfers from agricultural 
to non-agricultural activities in the socio-economic sense. 
This paper is concerned with internal migration since the early 1960' s when Korea :was 
about to begin its rapid economic development. The time-span of this study addresses 
itself to a close association between economic development and internal migration. Rapid 
industrialization (as represented by a high GNP growth rate of 9.4% per annum in the 
years of 1961 """"75) that Korea has enjoyed during the past two decades has called for a 
large labor force which had to originate from rural sector. In due course, internal migra-
tion is attributed to other social changes such as the reorganization of the national space 
and urban expansion on the one hand, and achievement motivation ever-prevailing in every 
Korean's mind and nuclearization of the family structure on the other hand. To this effect, 
migration appears as a social issue. 
This paper will begin with a brief review of the current state of Korean internal mig-
ration. The review will be made from a macro-scopic perspective. What follows is a closer 
examination of the experiences that inmigrants to Seoul undergo. This attempt may bE' 
justified on the ground that Seoul ever remains as a prime receptor of outmigrants from 
local cities and rural sectors to the extent that 6 out of 10 migrants were destined to the 
city in 1970""""75. Therefore, the second part of this paper concerning Seoul inmigrants 
will adopt a somewhat intermediate approach, as compared with the first part of the paper. 
While a macro-scopic, highly aggregate approach is good for an overview of general trends 
of internal migration, it is not specific enough to identify social factors of migration in 
regard. to policy purposes. In this sense, an interm~diate approach focusing on inmigr,ants 
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to the big city as favored by most of the potential migrants in Korea will be called for 
as an alternative one, complementary to the built-in weakness of the aggregate approach. 
Lastly, the paper ends with a brief description of the experiences and effects of, if any, 
migration policies. Until recently, Korea has experienced two major migration policies: one 
is a population dispersal policy aimed at pulling population from the capital city, and the 
other is a relocation policy undertaken within the Seoul metropolitan region. These policy 
experiences will be selectively discussed. 
Part I: Macro-scopic patterns of Korean Internal migration, 1961'"'-'75 
In examining the characteristics and patterns of internal migration, it is useful to discuss 
them from three perspectives: (1) where migrants go; (2) who moves; and (3) why they 
move. 
1. Where migrants go 
Urban orientation appears as a dominant mode in internal migration from 1961"'1975. 
Urban in migration from urban (39.2%) and rural sectors (37. 9%) makes up a share of more 
than 70 per cent of total internal migration volume during the above time-period, as seen 
in Table 1. Two major trends may be seen in this urban orientation of internal migration. 
First, urban-to-urban migration in urban orientation started to win a marginal edge over 
urban inmigration originating from rural sectors by the beginning of the 1970' s. Before 
the 1970' s, rural-to-urban flow accounted for 4 out of 10 migrants, while urban-to-urban 
flow accounteu for 3 out of 10 migrants. This trend, however, reversed itself during 
1970"'75. Four urban inmigrants out of ten came from the other urban sectors, whereas 
Table 1. Directions of internal ill igration, based on "residence five years ago," by 
residence: Republic of Korea, 1961 "'75 
_.- ----------------_._------ --------- . ---
,_ ;965-70BJ __ ._-!-1-_~-70-.. ~..,-_-75=B===~~~~~A~1_9-_6-1~"'~7~5-B_-
Urban/Urban SOO,433j 31. 711, 532, 1431 34.9 2,275,0561 44.21 4,307,632 39.2 
Rural/Urban 587,597 40.711, 826, 6651 41. 6 1, 754, 3461 34. 1 4, 168, 608 37.9 
Urban/Rural 1s3,5501 Iv. 71 387,077i 8.8 558, 318i 10.8 1, 098, 945 10.0 
Rural/Rural 200,601j 13.9, 648, 565i 1·1. 8, 563,284) 10.9 1, 412, 450 12.9 
_____ ~~~~ _______ 1_~~ 4:1~:1~;!-1~0. 0?~r-Z3-94' 450110()~O-?bT5,-i~o,-99'~I~~()~-o%I--IO' 987, 6351100.0% 
Directions I 1961"-66 
(From/to) j A* B 
* A denotes number of migrants and B does proportions 
Sources: Economic Planning Board, 1966, 1970, 1975 Population and Housing Census of Korea. 
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three out of ten migrants moved from the rural sectors. This pattern seems attributable to 
the fact that urban population in the nation increasingly approached to an even distribu-
tion point (48. 4%) with rural poulation(51. 6%) in 1975, as referred to Table 2. 
On the other hand, urban-to-rural, namely, reverse migration:and rural-to-rural migration 
remained almost constant in terms of their proportions to the total volume of internal 
migration in the years of 1961"'75. But rural-to-rural migration decreased in number th-
roughout the first half of the 1970' s, compared with the decade of the 1960' s. This fact 
seems attributable at most to a continuous decrease of rural population as an absolute number. 
From the viewpoint of spatial mobility, it can be hardly overstated that the migration 
stream in Korea in the period of 1961"-'75 centered on the big cities. A schematic 
diagram (Figure 1) showing inter-provincial net migration in 1969"'70 provides a glimpse 
at the migration pattern primarily directed toward the big cities of Seoul and Pusan. 
As far as inter-provincial migration flow is concerned, Seoul earned net gains from all 
the provincial boundaries of the national territory except for the remote island province of 
Jeju from 1961"-'1966. This trend has continued through 1966"-'1975 with a minor 
change in which Seoul registered a net loss to her neighboring province of Kyeong-gi in 
197<Yv75 while she gained a poulation increase even from the Jeju island, as seen in 
Figure 2. This minor change of migration pattern in the spatial sense implies a substantive 
expansion of the zone of influence by Seoul. In other words, the Seoul population is shown 
to have undergone an extensive suburbanization process beyond the municipal boundary 
of Seoul into Kyeong-gi and, at the same time, new migrants from the rest of the country 
prefer to settle down in cities near enough to enjoy the attractive agglomeration economy 
of Seoul. In this connection, cities of Suwon, Anyang, and' Boochun within a short reach 
of Seoul have increased in population at the rates of 5. 6%, 8.0%, and 13. 6% per annum, 
respectively, far higher than the average urban population growth rate of 5.2% in 1970,....,75. 
Table 2. Population distribution by residence, 196U""75 
1 9 6 0 1 9 6 6 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 5 
Area 
PopulationlDistribution PopulationjDistribution PopulationlDistribution PopulatiOnjDistribution 
(1, ODDs) (percent) (1, ODDs) (percent) (1, ODDs) (percent) (1, ODDs) (percent) -
Rural 17,788 71.2 19,213 65.8 17,859 60.3 17,888 51. 6 
Urban 3,592 14.4 4,761 16.3 5,110 16.2 7,449 21. 5 
Metrop-
3, 609 14.4 5,219 17.9 7,402 23.5 9,344 26.9 olitan 
All areas 24,989 100.0 29,193 100.0 31,469 100 .. 0 34,681 100.0 
*Metropolitan areas are defined the two biggest cities of Seoul and Pusan. 
Source: Economic Planning Board, Korea Statistical Yearbook: 1976. 
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Fig 1: Inter-provincial net migra,tion in 1969~70* 
-1,000 -:i,OOO ..... -- -10, 000 Gil, IlOO IOO,OOO 
*The areas bounded by arcs indicate the comparative sizes of provincial populations. 
Source:Lee(1973:16) 
As for urban inmigration, Pusan, the second biggest city in Korea, repeats Seoul's exp-
erience and even shows a more rapid population growth rate than Seoul during the first 
half of the 1970' s. In all, the metroplitan provinces of Seoul and Pusan gained net mig-
rants of 5.7 million in 1961"'75. A summary table (Table 3) based on the three population 
census undertaken in 1966, 1970 and 1975 tells that the two metropolitan provinces experienced 
4.4 times mmigration and, on the contrary, 0.8 times outmigration volume compared with 
the non metropolitan provinces. Accordingly, these trends bring about a positive net migration 
rate of 11. 5 per hundred residents for Seoul and Pusan, and a negative net migration rate 
of 3. 3 for the nonmetropolitan provinces. As such, Seoul and Pusan gain 291. 4 inmigrants 
for every 100 outmigrants, while the non-metropolitan provinces merely gained 54.8. 
The predominant urban orientation, as found in Korean internal migration patterns, emp-
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Fig 2: Pattern of Net Migration in Seoul: 1961"'66 and 1970"'75* 
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*The diagram for 1961"'66 was adapted fr,pm Cho(1973) and the data for 1970"'75 are from 
1975 Population and Housing Census of Korea . 
Table 3. Migration status ratios for Seoul and Pusan metropolitan areas 
and the other provinces, 1961"'75 
1961"-'66 1966"'70 1970"'75 1961"'75 
Migration status ratio Seoul &1 Other Seoul &\ Other Seoul &\ Other Seoul &1 Other 
Pusan Provinces Pusan Provinces Pusan Provinces Pusan Provinces 
Outmigrants per 100 4.8 5. 0 5. 1 8. 7 7.4 8.3 6.0 7. 3 residents in province 
Inmigrants per 100 
16. 8 2. 5 20. 3 4.0 15. 8 5.4 17. 5 4.0 residents in province 
Net migrants per 100 12. 0 - 2.5
1 
15.2 -4. 7 8. 4 - 2. 9 11. 5 ~3.3 residents in province 
Inmigrants per 100 347.4 400. 0 46. 4 212. 4 65. 6 291. 4 54.8 outmigrants 50.4
1 
Sources: EPB, 1966, 1970, 1975 Population and Housing Ceusus of Korea. 
hasizes the primacy that Seoul, the capital city of the Republic, has enjoyed throughout its 
history. While absorbing 63% of urban inmigrants in the years of 1961.-v66, almost coin-
cident with the time-span of the ambitious first 5-year economic development plan Cl 962.-v 
66) which was undertaken by the central government of Korea , Seoul turned out to be 
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one of the best examples of overurbanization or hyperurbanization (2) the world over, as 
referred to in Table 4. Seoul has never failed to maintain her primacy in the national 
urban hierarchy, despite being observed to have a relative decrease in the ratio of absorb-
ing urban-oriented migrants. Consequently, it brought about the situation that one out of 
five Koreans resides in the municipal boundary of Seoul in the late 1970' s. 
Table 4. IntercensaI population growth rate (percent) by area, 1960"-'75 
1960'"'-'66 1966'"'-'70 1970'"'-'75 1960"-'75 
Urban 5.8 7.1 5.4 6.0% 
Seoul 7.6 9.9 4.4 7.1% 
Pusan 3.5 7.1 5.4 5.8% 
Rural 1.3 -1.9 +0.0 +0.0% 
Town 2.7 1.8 5.3 3.3% 
All areas 2.7 1.9 2.0 2.2% 
"Urban" is defined the area administratively designated as city, having a population of 50, 000 
and more, and "Rural" indicates non·urban area. Town is defined the agglomerated settlement 
administratively designated as Eup, having a population of 20,000"-'50,000. 
Sources; EPB, 1966, 1970, 1975 Population and Housing Census. 
2. Who moves: 
Age selectivity appears remarkable in Korean internal migration which took place from 
1961 to 75: the productive age groups of 10""39 were more mobile than the other age-specific 
groups (Table 5). In particular, the age groups of 10'"'-'19 and 20"'-'29 accounted for the 
majority of all migrants. Specifically speaking, the age group of 10'"'-'19 was more mobile 
in migration flow destined to urban sectors, but less mobile in its flow to rural sectors. In 
comparison, the age groups of 20'"'-'29 and 30'"'-'39 were active in both streams of rural and 
urban inmigration, as seen in Figure 3. 
A high degree of mobility shown in the young age group of 20"'-'29 may be attributed 
to the fact that they are involved in first job-seeking, compulsary military service, education 
and training, and marriage. In detail, the age group of 10"-'19(31. 0%) is the most mobile 
one in rural· to-urban migration stream, followed by the next most mobile group of 20~29 
(29_ 6%), as it happened in 1961'"'-'75. And in urban-to-rural migration in the same period 
as above, the age group of 20'"'-'29(34.1%) is the most mobile with the second most mobile 
(2) Hyperurbanization is defined as implying a doubling rate in urban population of at least twen-
ty years, and, accordingly, showing an urbanization rate of 3. 5 per cent or more per 
annum. The concept is more or less conceived to describe a prolonged condition of 'rapid 
urban growth producing strains and tensions in social system. John Friedmann Cl973:91). 
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Urban- Rural- Urban Urban 
to' to- inmig- inmigration 
Urban Urban ration 
1 Female (1) (2) 0)+(2) Male 
12.7 10.3 11. 6 13.3 11. 7 
22.9 34.1 28.2 25.4 22.7 
27.4 29.6 28.8 24.8 33.0 
20.3 14.3 17.5 22.0 16.4 
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Sources: EPB, 1966, 1970, 1975 Population and Housing Census of Korea. 
age group of 30,...,39(22.1%). One interpretation is that young labor force yet to be trained 
moves from rural areas in an attempt to find jobs and/or educational opportunities in 
either big cities or booming industrializing cities. Some of them fail to find jobs and, after 
a while, may decide to return to the rural sector in their twenties or thirties. As for the 
sexual composition of urban inmigrants in regard to age-specific composition, the most 
mobile age group for men is the age group of 10 to 19, while that for women is at the 
ages of 20""'29, as seen in Figure 4. A reason for the latter, if other things are constant, 
may be attributed to the fact that, according to Korean custom, women should be in more 
frequent move to formate a household by marriage than their sexual counterparts. 
Educational selectivity is another predominant featu~e in the migration stream. Migration 
studies more often than not indicate that the more educated, the more mobile. The Korean 
experience is no exception to the case, as seen in Figure 5. Both men and women manifest 
themselves in a significant association between geographical mobility and the educational 
attainment of junior high school and over. What is more, educational selectivity can be 
borne out in regard to migration directions. As seen in Table 6, urban orientation of 
college-educated migrants is much higher in the urban-to-urban flow (23. 8% and 23.2% 
in the case of male migrants in 1966""'70 and 1970""'75, respectively); compared with 
rural-to-urban flow (7.8% and. 7.9% in the same accounts made above), rural-to-rural 
flow (6.8% and 7.3%) and urban-to-rural flow (17.7% and 16.0%) . 
. A matter worthy of note is the fact that there is a considerably high percentage of 
college-educated male migrants in urban-to-rural flows. At a first glance, it may be conceived 
as incompatible with the popular pattern of educational selectivity in city-wise migration. 
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Two probable reasons can account for this: First, college graduates might exhibit residential 
mobility to suburban areas within metropolitan regions, of which some parts still belong 
to rural areas according to the current areal classification for administative purposes. Second, 
skilled labor forces having college degrees might voluntarily move to or be requested by 
the multi-plant companies headquartered at big cities to move to newly emerging industrial 
complexes located in remote areas. Bureaucrats and teachers in the postion of civil servants 
who move into rural areas may also belong to the latter category (Yu, 1978: 123). 
As for job selectivity, it is not as much applicable to the internal migratien of Korea 
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Table 6. Proportions of college·educated ones to total volume(%) of migrants by 
migration direction and sex, in 1966"-'70 and 1970"-'75 
_____ Year 
----------.. 1966"-'70 1970"-'75 
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Mig:ration direction (from·to) "'" Male I Female Male I Female 
Urban-Urban 23.8 8.6 23.2 9.1 
Urban-Seoul 16.7 6.9 15.9 4.4 
, Urban-Pusan 2.2 0.6 2.3 0.4 
Rural-Urban 7.8 4.5 7.9 1.7 
Rural-Seoul 3 .. 9 3.7 4.3 0.8 
Rural-Pusan 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.1 
Urban-Rural 17.7 4.7 16.0 5.4 
Rural-Rural 6.8 0.9 7.3 1.2 
Sources: Economic Planning Board, 1970 and 1975 Population and Housing Census. 
as educational selectivity, as seen in Figure 6 and Table 7. Skilled workers such as pro-
fessionals, technicians,administrators and business managers, and office workers amount to 
19.4% in cities and 4.5% in rural areas out, of their respective employed labor forces. 
These figures can be taken to refqte job selectivity: a proportion (19.4%) of the skilled 
labor force to employed labor force residing in urban areas to be joined by rural outmig· 
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Sources: EPB, 1970 and 1975 Population and Housing Census. 
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Table 7(a). Proportions of employed migrants by job category migration 
direction and sex, 1965~1975 
Job categories 
Professional, technical and related workers 
Administrative and managerial workers 
Clerical and related workers 
Sales workers 
Service workers 
Agricultural and related workers 
Production and other workers 
Unclassified 
Total in Number(l,OOO Persons) 
I Migrants in 1965"-'1975 
Rural to urban migrationj Urb~n t~ rural 
1 
mlgratton 












































Sources: Economic Planning Board, 1970 and 1975 Population and Houseing Census. 
Table 7(b). Proportions of employed non·migrants by job category and sex, 1970 
Non-migrants in 1970 
Job categories Urban areas 
I 
Rural areas I 
Male [Female 1 Total I Male I Femaie 1 Total 
Professional, technical and related workers 5.81 4. 7 5.5 2.4 0.9 1.9 
Administrative and managerial workers 2.8 0.3 2.1 0.4 0.0 0.3 
Clerical and related workers 13.5/ 7.7 11.8 3.4 O. 7 2.3 
Sales workers 19.0 20.4 19.4 4.5 5.1 4.7 
Service workers 7.3 27.3 12.9 2.5 3.8 3.0 
Agricultural and related workers 9.9 8.3 7.3 72.6 81. 4 76.0 
Production and other worker 43.0 31. 0 39.6 13.3 7.8 11. 2 
Not adequately described 1.6 0.3 1.2 0.8 O. 1 0.5 
Unclassified 0.2 O. 1 0.2 O. 1 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0[ 100.01 100.01 100.01 100. oj 100.0 
Total in Number (1, 000 Persons) 2, 6831 1, 0601 3, 742[ 3,8951 2, 5151 6,411 
Source: Economic Planning Board, 1970 Population and Housing Census. 
rants is higher)han that02.2%) of skilled labor force out of employed workers in migra-
tion. In support of the above discussion, a ratio (19.6%) of the skilled labor force to 
employed labo(forces in urban-to-rural move is far higher than that (4.5%) of the skilled 
labor force to employed workers of rural areas in residence (Yu, 1978:125). 
The negative job selectivity in rural-to-urban migration can be elaborated further. Two 
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Fig 6: Occupational distribution of urban inmigrants in 1966,-..,75 by sex, and all Koreans in 1970 
% 
--- nil Koreans in 1970 
----- male inmigrants in 19GG~ 75 
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A: Professional, technical and related workers 
B: Administrative and managerial workers 
C: Clerical and related workers 
D: Sales workers 
E: Service workers 
F: Agricultural and related workers 
G: Production and other workers 
F 
Sources: EPB, 1970 and 1975 Population and Housing Census. 
G 
job categories of drivers, manual and related workers, and sales workers account for 52.0% 
and 16.1% out of employed male workers in the migration flow, respectively. As for 
female migrants, 78. 6% of them are destined to be engaged in drivers, manual and related 
jobs (47.0%), and service jobs (31. 6%) in urban areas. Regardless of male or female 
migrants, they are common in terms that they would have difficulty getting employed in 
modern sectors in cities because of their low educational attainment and poor preparedness 
for urban life. 
More often than not, these male workers are reduced to low-status, low-skilled and 
low-pay job opportunities such as construction and manual jobs, peddlers, janitors and 
so on. Likewise, the job market for women is no more promising than male migrants. 
Many of them are engaged in "sweat" jobs such as those found in weaving and clothing 
factories, electronics companies, and the like. What is worse, a considerable number of 
young female migrants have no choice but to take notorious "underground" jobs such as 
massagers and prostitutes. In due course, the apparent polarization of urban job opport-
unities between modern and traditional sectors, typical for developing countries is getting 
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worse rather than being converged, so long as an unceasing stream of yet-to-be urbanized 
labor force flow into big cities, and find it difficult to secure jobs in modern sectors and, 
even if possible, it would take much time to find them. 
3. Why they move 
Migration causes have received greater attention from concerned academicians and policy 
makers. A few studies have been filed with special reference to the case of recent Korea, 
and they easily lend themselves to two different kinds of studies varying with the 
perspective they adopt. One is the rigorous statistical approach designed to identify migration 
causes by making use of objective, quantitative variables largely in economic terms and 
partly in geographical terms. The other goes on the basis of social surveys aimed at the 
identification of socio-psychological and economic motives hidden behind the decision-making 
and action-taking of migration. The two research styles must be of complementary use 
between'each other to answer the question as to why people move. 
A quantitative study by regression analysis (Kim, 1976) came to the conclusion that 
migration volume in the case of Korean migration in 1966"-'70 is significantly associated 
with wage level and job opportuniti~s available in the destination places, and transportation 
distances' between origins and destinations. Put specifically, male migrants in the age group 
of 39"'44 are found to show more sensitive response to wage level, job opportunity of the 
destination places, and moving costs than the age group of 15"-'29. But both groups are 
common: in that the variable of job opportunity in the destination places is proved more 
significant than that of wage level in the former. On the other hand, the variables of job 
opportunity and wage level observed in the origin places appear insignificant in explaining 
the internal migration. 
As far as the "push-pull theory" is concerned, these results suggest that ·puW theo~y 
is more valid than "push" theory in the Korean case. In other words, it seems likely that 
prosperous urban economies attract rural migrants to a greater extent than rural economies 
seemingly in stagnation. The same study also reveals that female in migrants in the ages 
of 15"-'29 respond more sensitively to job opportunity and wage level in Seoul than their 
sexual coounter-parts' in the same age group. Also female migrants in the age group of 
30""-'44 are known to conceive wage levels in the destination and transportation distance to 
Seoul as being important in their decision-making for migration. 
On other hand, attitude surveys(Table 8) were undertaken to examine motivation leading 
to migration into Seoul. Regardless of migration units by either household or single, more 
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Table 8. Mobility motives by inmigrants to Seoul 
1 9 6 6 1 9 7 0 
Motives Household 
I 
Single migration Single migrati-migration on from rural 
No (%) No (%) areas (%) ---
Economic Job-place related 
motives Job-seeking 131 (29.1) 188 (38.7) (52.9) 
Job-transfer 99 (22.0) (57.5) 73 (15.0) (54.7) (5.7) (59. 6) 
Job-opening 29 (6.4) 5 0.0) 0.0) 
Socio- Marriage 4 (0.9) 28 (5.8) (4.4) . 
cultural Second genera- 27 (6.0) 1 (0.2) tion's education 
motives Going to school 9 (2.0) 02.0) 63 (13.0) (25.6) (i2.2) 09.0) 
Family reunion 35 (7.8) 32 (6.6) (2.0) 
Military service 3 ·(0.7) (0.4) 
Psychologi- Longing for ur- . 22 (4.9) 45 (9.3) (1. 6) 
cal moti- ban life Disgust against 13 (2. 9) (25. 1) 8 (1. 6) (19. 7) (20.0) ves rural life 
Improving the 
quality of life 78 (17.3) 43 (8.8) (18.4) 
Others 0.4) 
I I (100.0) Total 450 (100.0) 486 (100.0) (n=756) 
--------------------.--~-------------~--- .----~~--~=---
Source: Yoon (1976:21) 
I 
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than half of the Seoul inmigrants perceive economic motives such as job-seeking, job-opening 
and job-transfer as the mosf important factors in their migration decision. A considerable 
number of migrants move to take advantage of socio-cultural amenities concentrated in 
SeouL The most attractive among them is educational opportunity in Seoul which has 
enjoyed a comparative advantage over those in the rest of the country. (3) In this connection, 
for instance, university study at a few distinguished higher education institutions located 
in Seoul is conceived as a guarantee for upward social mobility. Under these circumstances, 
it is no wonder at all that 13 percent of single migrants in 1966 moved to take advantage 
of better educational opportunities in Seoul. 
Psychological motives comprise three sub-categories: (1) a pull factor of "longing for 
urban life" as found in Seoul; (2) a push factor of "disgust for rural life" looming large 
in rural areas; and (3) the third factor of "improving the quality of life" seemingly inter-
mixed with the pull and push factor. Of the Seoul inmigrants, 17.3 per cent, who 
identify "improving the. quality of life" as an overriding determinant in the decision-
(3) As of 1975, there are 36 universities and 46 graduate schools in Seoul out of the national 
totals of 72. and 82, respectively. 
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making of migration, may be taken as people who feel pushed by declining. rural 
economies and, at the same time, pulled by thriving urban economies at their destinations. 
In most cases, they vaguely believe in, before their moves, greater availability of job 
opportunities in Seoul. But it poses another question as to whether perceived chances in 
Seoul have been taken into effect after their moves. The "push" factor of "disgusting for 
out-migrating places" is recorded to be fairly negligible among psychological motives. This 
outcome squares with the finding prov;ided by the quantitative study quoted above. Both 
of the findings conclude that the "pull" theory makes more sense than the "push" theory, 
as far as Seoul-ward migration is concerned. 
There is the ot~er empirical evidence (Lim, 1976: 89) in support of the "pull theory" app-, 
licable to urban i~migration. It confirms the fact that rural people prefer urban life. Asked 
where they want to live in the future, senior high school students located in rural areas 
express a strong desire to live in cities. Their preferences are for small-and medium-sized 
cities (47.1%) and big cities (25.0%). Of the sampled interviewees, only 25 per cent 
want to remain in rural areas. The reasons why they ·prefer urban life include "active 
social life" (41. 9%), "better educational opportunities" (23. 1%), and "higher cultural 
amenities" (22. 3%), as found in cities. 
Summary 
(1) Urban orientation is predominant in the direction of Korean internal migration. This 
pattern contributed much to the explosive growth rate of urban population in 1961"'75. 
(2) In urban orientation, big cities, in particular, Seoul, the capital city of the nation, 
turn out to be great recipients of migrants. 
(3) The Seoul metropolitan region is undergoing wide-scale spatial reorganization such as 
suburbanization and the expansion of the urban field in her own right. 
(4) As for age-specific characteristics of Korean internal migration during 1961"'75, the 
younger, the more mobile. That is, there is observed selective migration in terms of age 
structure. This pattern, however, appears to a lesser degree in rural in migration as against 
urban inmigration. 
(5) There may also be noted educational selectivity in which the more educated are, 
the more mobile, in particular, in a direction toward urban sectors. As an exceptional case 
to this pattern, college-educated migrants are, to a great extent, found in the urban-to-rural 
migration flow. Their moves take place primarily due to job transfers within multi-location 
organizations, either public or private. For this reason, their moves seem unlikely to be 
Social Factors of Migration from Rural to Urban Areas 153 
permarient, but last no longer than 5 years. 
(6) Job selectivity is not as much applicable to the internal migration of Korea as educa-
tional selectivity. What may account for this pattern is that many migrants attempt to 
realize upward occupational mobility by educating their second generation. 
(7) In an aggregate sense, the economic factor is the prime cause as found in Korean 
internal migration. Since thriving urban economies attract migrants to a greater extent 
than they are pushed by relatively stagnant rural economies, the "pull" theory is more 
valid than the "push" theory in regard to the recent Korean experience. 
(8) The rapid growth of the national economy has, for the past two decades, called for 
a great number of surplus labor from rural s~ctors. This public interest to a great extent 
has been matched by private int~rest in that every migrant attempts to achieve ·upward 
mobility in the socio-economic sphere. 
(9) As a matter of fact, economic cause as the prime reason for migration is closely 
interrelated with social, psychological, and cultural factors mostly available in big cities. 
This is self-evident because economic factors stand in a circular causal relation with des i-
rabIe, non-economic causes. 
Part II: Behaviors of inmigrants to Seoul 
The preceding discussion was made from the standpoint that is largely aggregative and 
macro-analytic in nature. Although reflecting social dynamics implied in internal migration, 
a macro-scopic approach as to how migration events occur leave a number of important 
questions unanswered. In this context, questions worthy of examination have to include: 
(1) By which evaluative process do individuals decide to migrate? (2) How does migration 
take place? (3) How do they adapt themselves to urban environments? And (4) to what 
extent do they achieve what they expect in urban sectors? In an effort to answer these 
questions, an alternative approach as an intermediate-scale analysis is called for to discuss 
behaviors of individual migrants. The approach is of use in learning about socio-economic 
mobility which rural migrants experience in urban circumstances. This attempt may be 
facilitated by focusing on rural migrants who have poured into those big cities predomi-
nantly preferred by active and potential Korean migrants. 
What follows is concerned with the rural migrants who have moved into Seoul. Paying 
attention to Seoul is justified primarily because it is the capital city of Korea and has, for 
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a long time, absorbed a great volume of migrants both from urban and rural sectors, as 
pointed out earlier. On this account, in migrants to Seoul have received more attention 
than those to any other city from concerned policy-makers. And there exist qualified studies 
which have attempted to elaborate behavioral patterns with special reference to inmigrants 
to Seoul. 
1. Decision-making of migration 
There is little relevant, reliable information as to how inmigrants decide to move to 
Seoul. But it is a common understanding that all Koreans in every corner of the country 
long to live in Seoul where major social values are perceived as being concentrated. In 
fact, the phenomenal skewedness of various well-being indicators is observed in favor of 
Seoul, compared with the rest of the country. The spatial dualism is as eloquantly remarked 
as "the capital city and the Republic of Seoul", as France is nickamed as "Paris and the 
desert of France". The reality at issue that various societal values are concentrated in 
Seoul is represented in Table 9. 
Under these circumstances, it cannot be overestimated that every potential migrant is 
well· informed that Seoul is more thriving than any other urban center in Korea. This 
description has bearing on: (1) the overriding primacy of Seoul over other local urban 
economies in the national urban hierarchy, (2) a very low percentage of illiterates within 
the· national population, and (3) the small size of the Korean territory, where distance 
friction does not present a difficult problem to overcome on the part of migrants. 
Table 9. Share of Seoul in major economic indicators: 1976 
Area (Km2) 
Population(l,OOO) 
Gross national/urban products(billion w 
Per capita income (I, 000 won) . 
No. of manufacturing firms 
Internal revenue(billion won) 
No. of corporations 
Total amount of saving(billion won) 
Total amount of loan(billion won) 
No. of market facilities 
No. of medical doctors 
Tax payable income earners(l, 000) 
-----
on*) 
*One U.S. dollar is equivalent to 610 won, to date. 
Source: The National Chamber of Commerce, 1978. 
I NatTo~e(A) I Seoul(B) I B/ A(%) 
98,824 628 0.6 
36,450 7,525 20.6 
4,767 1,526 32.0 
624 960 153.8 
22,787 5,988 26.2 
1,282 742 57.8 
16,199 11,360 70.1 
369 234 63.5 
372 245 65.8 
640 252 ·49.3 
11,381 4,651 40.8 
1,103 579 52.2 
-. 
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Nonetheless, people informed of Seoul's attractiveness do not necessarily move to Seoul. 
Since no study has ever been made comparing people informed of Seoul and, thereafter 
moved to Seoul, with those informed of Seoul, but having not moved as yet to Seoul, it 
is not possible to make any accurate judgement on the behavior of immigrants to Seoul. 
Even though their behaviors should be examined in such a comprehensive manner as 
indicated above, what has been disclosed thus far is the fact that information disseminated 
by relatives and friends concerning opportunities at the possible destination plays a greater 
role in the decision-making and action-taking· of migration, as examined by many case 
studies concerning developing countries. (Shaw, 1975:92; Findley, 1977:15) 
A study (Yoon, 1970: 147) examines the role of information channels working on 
inmigrants to Seoul. As revealed by the study, four out of 10 inmigrants (Table 10) fall 
short of any information sources including family, relative and acquaintance before migration 
But this finding may not be applicable to the other types of migration by family-in-part 
and single, as eight out of such ten cases in both family-in-part and single migration 
depend on personal ties such as family, relatives and acquaintances, who have previously 
moved to Seoul, as information sources. On the contrary, one out of two cases in family 
migration dares move to Seoul without any personal tie. 
Table 10. Migration channels by migration type 
~ Type Total Family 
Family- Single Others migration in-part migration 
Migration channel ", No. r % No. j No. I % No. I % No. I % ~ % 
Family 329 14.8 167 10.9 124 40.8 37 9.5 '1 2.0 
Relatives 657 29.5 478 30.8 264 25.7 116 29.7 4 7.8 
Acquaintances 355 15.9 148 9.6 22 8.8 162 41. 4 23 45.1 
None 885 39.8 747 48.7 39 15.7 76 19.4 23 45.1 
Total 
\
2,2261100.011,5351100. 01 2401100. oj 3911100.01 511100.0 
(100'0) (69.0) (1l.2) (17.6) (2.3) 
Source: Yoon (1970). 
As for single migrants, decision-making to move is influenced by acquaintances (41. 4%), 
relatives (29.7%), and family (19.5%) in order. A qualitative study (Brandt, 1973) is 
interesting in the sense that it is intended to describe the behaviors of single migrants 
into Seoul in further detail. It classifies them into three categories: (1) "the boy or girl, 
usually not always from a poor household, who leaves or runs away from what he regards 
as an intolerable situation": (2) "those who leave home with the blessing or acquiescence 
of their families" and (3) "the sons and daughters of well-to-do rural and provincial 
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families, who come to Seoul in order to continue their education or to fill some prearranged 
slot in business". 
By comparison of these categories with Yoon's findings ClQ70) , single migrants having 
no reliable information (19.4% of the total single migrants) belong mostly to the first 
group as classified by Brandt. He is quoted as saying that "they are committed to making 
their own way in Seoul and expect neither help from home nor a refuge there if they 
fail" (Brandt, 1973: 7). On the other hand, the second and third groups fall into the single 
migrants who are furnished information by the family, relatives or acquaintances (41. 4%). 
The point being made in this connection is that information channels on the part of mig-
rants serve in most cases as patrons ready to help those in finding urban homesites and, 
if possible, jobs. What have been discussed thus far leads to a conclusion that a chain 
migration mode is predomip.ant in Seoul-wise population movement. The mode works to 
accelerate inmigration to Seoul with the help of family-like ties such as relatives and 
acquaintances. 
As far as the migration process is concerned, a step-wise migration pattern is noticed 
in the inmigration stream to Seoul. Literature (4) concerning migration patterns in developing 
countries indicates that a stepwise migration pattern appears popular particularly in rural-
to-urban movement. The pattern takes place in such that migrants move from rural areas 
to small-sized cities, from small-sized cities to medium-sized cities, and at last, from medium-
sized cities to big cities. 
A sample survey (Barringer, 1974) finds that, of the in migrants into Seoul under survey, 
38. 1 percent experience step-wise migration, whereas the rest come directly from places 
of origin. The step-wise pattern seems less frequent than what is found to be typical for 
many other developing countries. This observation is attributable to the fact that Korea is 
small in territorial size and, accordingly, the distance factor in migration is not significant. 
Otherwise, it is because the cost migrants have to pay for their move to Seoul is, by the 
estimation of opportunity cost, far less than what they might have paid for at other altern-
ative urban destinations, as long as Seoul's economy works more vigorously than elsewhere. 
What is more, there is no ethnic segregation in Korea which is noted for homogeneity 
in culture, language and way of life. Accordingly, a theoretical assertion that social dis-
tances between places of origin and destination would likely inhibit direct flows is by no 
means applicable to inmigration \to Seoul. 
(4) Among others, see Breese (1968:83) and Shaw (1975:45-6). 
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2. Job mobility of the in migrants 
A theoretical discussion (Thompson, 1972) contends that inmigrants into big cities usually 
become better-off, regardless of where their origins are. The point is made in that social 
costs the inmigrants incur at destinations and origins, particularly, of either small cities or 
rural areas is not their concern at all. The inmigrants do not take account of such social 
costs as increased congestion, greater trip distances and inner-city housing shortage to 
which they would contribute, when making their decision to move into big cities. It does 
not necessarily mean, however, that they would be free from urbanization costs they pay 
for on an individual basis. In this context, what follows focuses on how inmigrants to 
Seoul adjust themselves to urban life from the standpoint of occupational mobility. 
At the outset, migrants to urban sectors attempt to have the quality of their lives 
improved in the socio-economic sphere. How much they achieve of what they aim at can 
be answered in part by how they feel about their living conditions after migration. A 
number of case studies are available to this end. Barringer's (1974) finds that half of in-
migrants to Seoul are satisfied with living conditions after migration. Of the surveyed 
migrants, 41. 6 per cent feel "somewhat better" with after-the-move living condition, and 
9. 4 per cent feel "much better", whereas one-third (33. 5%) do not feel any change in their 
living condition. On the other hand, a small portion expresses dissatisfaction with Seoul 
to the extent that 9.7 per cent feel "somewhat worse", followed by 5.8 per cent feeling 
"much worse". Despite the substantial presence of those who are frustrated with urban 
life in Seoul, it seems more likely that the inmigrants, to a significant degree, succeed in 
upward mobility by leaving rural areas and, thereafter, by participating in the thriving 
urban economy of Seoul. 
From a temporal perspective, the inmigrants who feel "much better" or so are thought 
as those succeeded in achieving ones' goal mostly over an intragenerational time-span. 
In the meantime, of the frustrated inmigrants who failed to take intragenerational mobility 
into effect, many may work hard to realize their achievement goal through their next gen-
erations, say, intergenerational mobility. The same study quoted above identifies the occu-
pational mobility manifested by new migrants and native urbanites in Seoul over genera-
tional time-span, as shown in Table 11. It carries the categories of "father's occupation" 
(pr~-migratory status for migrants only), "first occupation in the city", and "present 
occupation" which are made to demonstrate generational mobility of the Seoulite; The 
categories are presumed to say that differences between "father's occupation" and "first 
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Table 11. Occupational mobility in Seoul 
Occupational category Father's I First occupation I Present Sector Occupation occupation occupation 
Survival 12.6 27.5 5. 0 
Unemployed or unclassified 12.3 16.4 4.0 
Unskilled labor 0.3 11. 1 1.0 
Primary 65.7 2.4 1.4 
Farmer-fisherman 65.7 2.4 1.4 
Secondary 1.7 17-0 17.8 
Transportation, communication, 1.0 9.7 12.9 mining 
Skilled labor and crafts o. 7 7.3 4.9 
Tertiary 20.0 53. 1 75.8 
Traditional 11.0 19.6 31. 3 
Service 0.4 1.6 10.3 
Sales-merchants 10.6 18.0 21. 0 
Modern 9.0 33.5 44.5 
Office-clerical workers 3.0 11. 3 12.7 
Managerial 2.4 12. 1 15.7 
Professional-technical 3.6 10.1 16.1 
Total 1 100. 0 C%) 1 100. 0 C%) 1 100. 0 C%) 
Source: Adapted from Barringer(l974). 
occupation" imply intergenerational mobility, while those between "first occupation" and 
·present occupation" may be defined as intragenerational mobility_ 
As such, the highest proportion of the occupational category which father's generation 
was engaged in centers on the unemployed or unclassified. Occupations in the city for the 
first time are distributed in a unsettled manner: while the unemployment rate goes higher 
than ever before, a plurality of the surveyed lives on tertiary activities such as office-clerical 
workers (1l. 3%), sales-merchants (18.0%), managerial (12.1%), and professional-technical 
(10.1%) jobs. In the remainder, a polarization phenomenon arises between unskilled labor 
(11.1%) and skilled labor and crafts (7. 3%). 
In contrast, the column "present occupation" in Table 1l addresses itself to the fact that 
the share of tertiary activities increases greatly in disproportion with a sharp rate-cut 
in unemployment. The proportional increase of tertiary activities may parallel to some 
extent qualitative, structural changes which accompany upward mobility from traditional 
or manual ones to modern service or professional sector. 
. The extent to which the inmigrants get through intragenerational and intergenerational 
mobility in job opportunities is succinctly defined in Figure 7. The figure is made on the 
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basis of the data adapted from Barringer's to this writer's attempt: the occupational 
categories of Barringer are sectorally grouped into the primary, secondary, tertiary activities, 
and survival sector(5) including the unemployed, unclassified and unskilled. Thereafter, 
tertiary activities may be divided into traditional and modern sectors. Figure 7 illustrates 
that the geographical mobility to Seoul parallels occupational transfers from the primary 
sector to the secondary or tertiary sector, within which development effect is also noticed 
in the move from the traditional sector to the modern one. 
As for the individual standpoint of every urban inmigrant, however, it is more than 
difficult to achieve upward mobility. In particular, upward mobility within an intragenerational 
time-span is not readily attainable on the part of unskilled in migrants. The difficulty is 
figured out to the extent that, i.e., professional jobs are continuously taken by those who 
(5) Survival sector is defined as encompassing unemployed workers, handicraft workers, street 
traders and service workers, casual construction workers, and "underground" occupation~, 
See Friedmann and Sullivan (1975:476). ,-. 
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Table 12. Occupational mobility of family·heads before and after migration to Seoul, 1973 
---- _. - -- - --
Total Job after migration 
Job after Migration 
(%) r(OI-C;-)-I-(;)T(~)[W-1 I number (6) (7) 
(1) Professional, technical I 99 I (6.9) 93 1 [ 2 2 (0.4) 1 and related workers 
(2) Administrative and 62 (4.3) 2 56 2 1 (0.2) 1 managerial workers 
(3) Clerical and related 247 (17.2) 5 7 181 15 5 34 (7.5) workers . 
(4) Sales workers 512 (35.7) 13 12 37 222 9 190(41. 8) 29 
(5) Service workers 114 (7.9) 2 2 4 20 42 42 (9.2) 2 
(6) Agricultural and related 21 (1. 5) 1 1 11 1 16 (3.5) 1 workers I 
(7) Production and other 381 (26.5) 1 4 51 26 3 
170(37.4) 173 workers 
Total 
1
1,436 I I 117[ 831 2301 2851 591 455(100.0)1 207 (100.0) (100.0) (8.2) (5. 8) (16.0) (19.8) (4.1) (31. 7) (14.4) 
----------------------~----~ 
Source: Y oon (1975). 
were professionals even before moving, as seen in Table 12. Such is the case for admin-
istrative and managerial workers, and clerical and related workers. In contrast, sales job 
are popular for those previously engaged in the former as well as those who were farmers 
before moving. Likewise, service and production jobs are feasible for low-skilled rural 
outmigrants. 
Immediately after their move to Seoul, rural outmigrants of farming origin find easy 
access only to trifling jobs such as sales (41. 8%), and production and related ones (37.4 
%), of which productivity is no better than in the agricultural sector. Specifically speaking, 
the jobs of sales and production are found, for the most part, in the individual-enterprise 
sector such as handicraft workers working on their own account, street traders, casual 
construction workers, and family-enterprise sector at trade and service establishments, and 
manufacturing workshops. The former includes traditional jobs such as small shop proprie-
tors, salesmen in small businesses, garage mechanics, truck, bus, and taxi drivers, barbers, 
beauticians, and restaurant workers, and the latter comprises workers in various kinds of 
smallscale manufacturing such as bakeries, rice mills, noodleshops, shoe and leather-ware 
manufacturing, tailoring, carpentry, and metal work. (Friedmann and Sullivan, 1975) 
As far as job mobility is concerned, young migrants draw considerable attention. This 
is because many of them are first . job-seekers. Therefore, a closer discussion concerning 
the job mobility which young single migrants individually undergo would be of use in 
figuring out how social mobility takes place concurrently with city-ward mobility. Brandt's 
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(1973) geared, more or less, to this end. His observation is intended to contrast the adjust-
ment process of the inmigrants in success and failure. His criterion to judge the successful 
assimilation of migrants to city life is determined by whether they were able to find steady 
employment. As for young man without connections or special skills, the construction 
industry is available at best to them. But construction jobs are subject to frequent lay-
offs depending on business cycle, apart from limited availability temporally confined to 
non-winter seasons between March and November. In many cases, these circumstances 
coerce them to find alternatives such as "carrying heavy loads in the market place, 
pushing hand carts, running errands, or attaching oneself to a skilled worker or shop 
owner as an unpaid apprentice." 
Because of poor job stability and growing dissatisfaction with their job environment, 
young migrants usually change jobs after six months of a year when they have established 
their networks and have looked over what the city has to offer. Worse yet, young migrants 
who fail to find jobs characterized by low-pay, low-status, and low-future prospects more 
often than not fall into underground jobs such as pimps, gangs, smugglers, black marke-
teers and so on. 
However, there are some opportunities for unskilled young migrants to find steady job 
in firms characteristic of the modern sector, which pay higher wages than any traditional 
job sectors. Once they get job opportunity, they work hard to adapt themselves to the 
urban jobs. Success stories in this category are filed by Brandt (1973) 
"Newly arrived village boys are often physically stronger, more docile. and willing to work 
for less than natives of Seoul. and. as a result. proprietors of small shops and labor intensive 
plants sometimes prefer them and even recruit in the countryside. If a country boy finds a job 
in a small firm that is growing. and if he is willing to work faithfully for years at low wages. 
his future is reasonably secure." 
As for female inmigrants yet to be skilled, it is commonly understood that many of 
them in their teen's or early 20' s get into the city as live-in maids. There are accounts 
of bright scenes for job mobility on the part of female migrants: (Brandt, 1973:14) 
"With practically no personal expenses she will usually be able to save enough in a year or 
eighteen months so that she can support herself while attending a vocational institute in order 
to learn hairdressing, wig making, machine knitting, or even taxi driving. Or she may find a 
job with an electronics firms or in a textile mill where the company will provide training. In 
two or three years, then, most girls who follow this route will have acquired a skill, a steady 
job, and some savings." 
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However, fastidious urban circumstances often stand in the way rather than for the 
well-being of female migrants. Poor educational achievement and lack of preparedness for 
urban life make them vulnerable in achieving an amenable quality of their lives. If and 
when they fail to find job opportunities, one of alternative choices that they might possibly 
make is to get involved in one of various sordid aspects of the "entertainment" industry, 
if possible, only for a short time for transitory purpose. After a while, however, it becomes 
extremely difficult for them to turn a different kind of life. 
Nevertheless, an interesting mode of behavior is found in the maladjusted female mig-
rants who have fallen from desirable upward mobility. The mode says that many female 
migrants involved in entertainment jobs like bar girls or other miserable jobs seem 
rather unlikely to give up upward mobility. Although they fail to realize it by themselves, 
they work even harder to get it through "chain" mobility in which they save their earn-
ings in order to educate their younger brothers or sisters left back in their home town. 
Whereas such behavior is not fully documented, nor has it been properly surveyed and 
analyzed, anecdotes telling of the deadly motivated behavior of ambitious female status-
seekers are featured in newspapers from time to time. A story (6) tells of a bus conductress 
at 32-year, who had been working since age 18. 
"By spending almost all her earnings, she succeeded in paying back a debt left by her father 
who died of a terminal disease on the hand, and helped by fully supporting two brothers of hers 
to graduate from senior high school. For the past 14 years, she has never eaten out and missed 
even lunch more often than not. And she, who has as yet to get married, has never bought any 
pieces of cloth for her own use, and slept at night in a make-shift room in the bus company's 
office. " 
How determined she has been in working toward her life goal is glimpsed in the mise-
rable environment of the job she holds. According to a recent survey (7) , more than 40 per 
cent of the bus conductresses interviewed were found to have used stimulants to shake off 
drowsiness and fatigue from overwork. The survey report also said that more than half 
of the conductresses had suffered from such job-related diseases as gastroenteritis, athlete's 
foot and anaemia. 
3. Settlement patterns of inmigrants 
The way that urban inmigrants find their housing receives greater attention in concerned 
(6) Dong-A Daily News, March 12, 1980. 
(7) The Korea Herald, March 15, 1980. 
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studies. This is so because finding adequate housings is as difficult for inmigrants as find-
ing jobs. As a questionnaire survey (Y oon, 1975) reveals, the most difficult problem the 
Seoul-bound migrants of rural origin face immediately after their move is to get jobs (37 
per cent). This is followed by difficulties with housing(S). Their adjustment to urban life 
is greatly dependent upon housing arrangements which is closely linked with job-finding 
information. 
At the outset, Yoon's studies (1970; 1975) are useful to learn of the housing conditions 
of inmigrants to Seoul. When the first survey was undertaken in 1968, only 30 per cent 
of the inmigrants under investigation owned houses regardless of their physical and legal 
status, whereas 32 per cent rented houses with a deposit which should be paid in advance and 
in a lump sum, followed by 20 percent dwelling in houses with an arrangement of monthly 
deduction of the rent deposit paid in advance, and 16 per cent solving their shelter pro-
blems by boarding (Table 13). In 1972 when another survey was made by the same author 
quoted above, the housing status of the inmigrants was worse than before. At the time of 
their first arrival in Seoul, only 26 per cent or 502 out of the surveyed 1954 inmigrant 
households owned their homes. As time passes, the housing ownership rate by the inmig-
rants grows merely to about 35 per cent. In this connection, the house ownership ratio 
of the inmigrants makes it not difficult to find them in a poorer housing situation than 
the older residents, of whom 54.4 per cent owned their houses in Seoul, as of 1970. 
Nevertheless, the above findings do not give any clue as to whether the housing the 
inmigrants find is standard or not from the .viewpoint of physical condition, and further, 
Table 13. Housing status of inmigrants by migration type 
Migra- Total Housing status 
Own /Rent in a IU-r Monthly I COI:p.pany I Boarding / Others tion type No. % mp sum mo- payment reSIdence No. (%) ney No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Family 1,535100.0 543 (35.4) 565 (36.8)' 359 (23.4) 16 (1. 0) 48 (3.1) 4 (0.3) 
Family- 249 100.0 54 (21. 6) 117 (47.1) 51 (20.6) 20 (10.1) 2 (0.6) in-part 
Single 391 100.0 50 (12.8) 31 (7.9) 23 (5.9) 3 (0.9) 277 (70.8) 7 (1. 7) 
Collec- 51 100.0 26 (51. 0) 8 (15.7) 12 (23.5) 5 (9.8) tive 
Total 12,222(100.0)1 673 (30.2)1 721 (32.4)1 445 (20.2)1 19 (8.5)1355 (16.0)1 13 (5.8) 
Source: Yoon (1970). 
(8) Other difficult problems next to housing are identified "running what is called business by 
the respondents" (10 per cent), and "unfamiliarity with urban transportation conveniences" 
(8 percent). 
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whether the housing was built with authorized permission or not. For this reason, the 
legal and physical status of shelters occupied by the inmigrants must be derived indirectly 
from statistics that show urban districts in which they find their housing. Of the inmigrant 
households covered by the survey, 58 per cent settled in standard residential areas or above, 
compared with 30 percent residing in substandard squatter areas, and about 10 per cent 
dwelling in non· residential areas poorly fit for minimum urban amenities. 
Housing ownership patterns by residential area also are an important indicator of the 
well-being of the in migrants in regard to housing conveniences. It was found that the 
patterns are closely associated with the residential locations of the inmigrants: in the case 
of substandard squatter areas, the housing ownership rate remains very low at a percentage 
of 22, while the proportions securing housing on a key money and rental basis are recorded 
. at 38 per cent and 31 per cent, respectively. 0n the other hand, the ownership rate of 
inmigrants who moved to standard residential areas accounted for 32 per cent. And. in 
these areas, the inmigrants, even if they could not own houses, usually pay key money 
for a house, or one or two rooms (41 per cent) which is more costly than housing acco-
modations on a rental basis (Yoon, 1975). 
4. Living conditions of squatters 
As for squatter settlers proper, information as to what extent the inmigrants settle down 
in squatter areas varies from government statistics to individual research. According to 
government statistics (9), only 20 per cent out of all inmigrants to Seoul in 1970"-'71 settle 
down in urban substandard houses built without authorized permission. On the other hand, 
an individual study (Kwon et ai, 1967: 73) revealed that almost 60 per cent of the sur-
veyed squatters identify rural and urban areas other than Seoul as places of origin imme-
diately before the present squatter settlement (Table 14). The underestimation of the num-
ber of in migrants directed to squatter settlement in the government statisfics seems, 
more or less, due to reluctance on the part of the Korean municipal governments to make 
public grim reality with which they have to cope. 
From a spatial perspective, there is a quality study (Lee, 1977) dealing with squatter 
areas in Seoul, which describes their major features: (1) The total area of squatter settlement 
is about 15 per cent of the total residential area of Seoul. In a locational sense, most 
squatter settlements are scattered along river banks on the one hand, and high ground 
areas and hill-side slopes on the other hand. (2) The spatial distribution of the squatters 
(9) Seoul Municipal Government, Seoul Statistical Yearbook, 1972. 
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Table 14. Places of origin prior to squatter settlement 
-
Immediately before Before the res(dence im-media tely 
Places of origin 
squatter settlement prior to squatter settlement 
I I number I percent number I percent 
Rural areas 1, 323 33. 1 98 35. 1 
Small towns 271 6.8 27 9.7 
Cities 670 16.7 76 27.2 
Seoul 1,659 41. 4 78 
I 
28.0 
Unknown I 80 2.0 - -
Total 4,300 I 100.0 I 279 100.0 
Source: Kwon, E-Hyuk et al. (1967:73). 
IS associated with the bus route systems. Many terminals for public transportation inter-
connect directly with squatter settlements, especially on the edge of the city. (3) High 
density squatter areas are geographically distributed in the area surrounding the central 
city. And (4) it seems likely that there is a significant correlation between the overall 
spatial distribution of squatters and the location of industrial employment structure in the 
city, although it is not proved by mapping analysis. 
These findings lead to a tentative conclusion that subsistance income groups mainly 
comprising recent inmigrants more than any other locational variable seek transportation 
convenience to the central city where there are plentiful modern as well as traditional 
jobs. This observation implies a clese association between the settlement and occupational 
mobility of the inmigrants(lO). 
As far as socio-economic mobility of squatters is concerned, when asked why they moved 
into squatter areas, the squatters surveyed identify "hard living" as the prime reason (32. 3 
per cent). This is followed by such major reasons as "seeking after jobs" (21. 6 per cent), 
"cheap housing cost" (16.8 per cent) and "failure in business" (12.1%) as shown in 
Table 15. Therefore it appears that poverty associated with hard living and failure in 
business might push them to move into squatter settlements (Kwon et aI, 1967). In a 
sense, "push" theory makes more sense than "pull" theory in explaining migration motives 
of squatters. 
(10) The locational behavior is also applicable to inmigrants well-prepared for new urban life 
in Seoul. Kwon (1972:262) points out that "when the settlement locations of the inmigrants 
are mapped, they appear to agglomerate along the major transit lines directly connected to 
the central business district. They also tend to follow rather strictly the equilibrium patt-
ern between the rent and the transportation time-distance-cost to the central place of the 
city. Hence, the city of Seoul has been growing in a larger circle concentrically, with 
transportation lines radially extending from the center." 
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Comparing the above findings with the survey quoted earlier, the squatters may for the 
most part belong to groups who feel "much worse" (5.8%) and "somewhat worse" (9.7 
%), about living conditions after migration, as surveyed by Barringer (1974:22). It is 
also believed that the groups defining their urban life after migration as "about the same" 
usually find their shelter in squatter areas. To this extent, the way of life and behavior 
observed in the squatter settlements represent a substantial volume of the in migrants who 
fall into the "worse-off" rather than "better-off" after-migration categories. 
Furthermore, the same study (Kwon et al 1967) indicates that many squatters have a 
very hard time improving the quality of their lives even after a considerable period of 
living in squatter settlements. The main reasons for a difficult life are: no skills (37. 4%), 
other employment-related accounts such as a loss of job by family head (14.1%) and 
failure in business (6. 1%), as seen in Table 16. Their subsistence employment status 
primarily stems from detrimental family structures such as an increase of dependent fami-
lies (10. 5%), single parent (8. 0%) mostly composed of mother and their children, a 
decrease of labor productivity due to old age (4.6%), and sickness of family head (3. 4%) 
or family members (1. 2%). As a result, of the economically active labor force among 
squatters, 75.8 per cent remain unemployed (see Table 17). Even when employed, what 
they can find is mostly handy employment which comprises daily wage earning (47.9%), 
peddling (15. 9%) and manual labor 02. 0%), as seen in Table 17. 
Table 15. Reasons for moving into squatter areas 
Reasons 
hard living 
seeking after job 
cheap housing cost 
failure in business 
lack of any definite plan 
accompanying relatives 
failure in farming 
second generation's education 
transportation conveniences 
refuge from the Korean War 
demolition of the previous shelter 
born 
unknown I 
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Table 16. Reasons for hard lives of squatters by squatter location 
Location 
Reasons '~-. 
--I Riverside I 
tribu~~ries Flat I b~~kerof , Hillside I ~ v~~age the Han 
no skills 
loss of job by family head 
increase of dependent family 
single parentCmother and kids) 
failure in business 
decrease of labor productivity due to old age 
sickness of family head 
sickness of family members 
loss of earnings by military service 
unknown 
Total 
Number of households 

















































100.0%1 100. 0% 
1, 904 4,222 
As such, the subsistence economies do not easily allow squatters to improve themselves 
in housing status. This fact is borne out by the fact that most of them (64.8%) have 
lived in squatter areas for one year or more (see Table 18). Furthermore, 33 per cent 
cannot afford to escape from the vicious cycle of squatter dwelling within 5 years or more. 
Nevertheless, a promising sign noticed in Seoul is the fact that there are found to be 
fewer cases of intergenerational squatter living in Seoul, as against common cases persisting 
for more than two generations, as observed in many underdeveloped countries. By the 
Table 17. Employment status in squatter areas 
Occupation 
none 
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100.0 
23,481 
















Table 18: Duration of dwelling at the present squatter house by squatter location 
---- Location \ K 'd fl I River bank I 
I 
IverSI e 0 Fl t Hillside Average 'b' a area of the Han 
_ DU~ESlI1 of d~~mng ~._._______t~l _~ tane~ ____ 
--~----
3-6 months 25.3 20. 1 16.2 24.4 
f 
22.2 
6 months-1 year 17.1 11. 6 12.0 12.3 13.0 
1-5 years 35.0 31. 9 34.0 29.6 
I 
31. 9 
over 5 years 22.6 36.4 37.8 33.7 I 32.9 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% I 100.0% I 100.0% 
Number of Households 780 698 840 1,904 4,222 
Source: Kwon et al (1967:41). 
way, most squatter households in Seoul have only one room, although 12.7 per cent occupy 
two rooms. The number of persons occupying one room is 4. 3 persons on the average. 
More than 90 per cent of them are short of portable water and have no sewage(Kwon et 
aI, 1968: 50""-'52). Half of the squatter houses are shanties made of thin board. 
Summary 
1. Information disseminated by relatives, friends and acquaintances on op'portunities at the 
possible destination plays a great role in the decision-making and action-taking of Seoul-
ward migration. 
2. From the standpoint of migration units, family-in-part and single migration are gen-
erally better informed about the city than family as a whole. This observation brings the 
conclusion that chain migration prevails in Seoul inmigration. 
3. Step-wise migration is not as popular as in many other developing countries. This is 
attributable to the fact that Korea is small in territory size and, accordingly, distance friction 
in migration is not significant. There is no ethnic segregation is Korea which is noted for 
homogeneity in culture and way of life. Consequently, there is neither social distance 
prohibiting extensive migration flows. 
4. Similar to urban inmigrants found in other developing countries, the social costs that 
Seoul in migrants might incur at their destination and origins do not concern them at all. 
5. In regard to the question as to what extent inmigrants to Seoul achieve their aims, 
half of them are satisfied with living conditions after migration. However, 15.5 per cent 
feel worse about living conditions in Seoul. Those in migrants feeling better-off seem to 
succeed in upward socio·economic mobility partly by intragenerational mobility and partly 
by intergenerational mobility. 
6. It is much difficult for recent inmigrants to achieve upward mobility. Such is, 
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particularly, the case of young, single migrants either male or female trying to find job 
opportunities at modern, urban sectors immediately after their move to Seoul. 
7. Among young inmigrants who fail to achieve upward mobility, many females refuse 
to give up their goals. Instead, they work even harder to achieve it through "chain" 
mobility by saving their earnings in order to pay for the education of their brothers or 
sisters left behind in their home towns, even though they are involved in "underground" 
jobs such as bar girls and prostitution. 
S. The adjustment of inmigrants to urban life of Seoul is closely related to housing 
arrangements, which, in turn, is closely linked with job information. 
9. Housing ownership is an important indicator of the well-being of urban population 
on an individual basis. The rate for recent inmigrants is much lower than that for old 
residents in Seoul. 
10. Regardless of whatever housing arrangements are accessible to recent inmigrants, 
four out of ten come to settle in substandard residential areas. 
11. From a locational perspective, the spatial distribution of squatter is associated, 
among other reasons, with the bus route system. 
12. As for squatters being joined by many of the recent inmigrants to Seoul, there is a 
close association between squatter settlements and squatters' occupational mobility. It may 
be seen in that the squatters under the survey identify "hard living" as the main reason, 
for moving into squatter areas. 
13. Difficulties met by the squatters stem from lack of job skills and other employment-
related accounts like a loss of job by family heads. Furthermore, their poor income status, 
for the most part, is attributable to such social factors as an increase of dependent families, 
single parents, a decrease of labor productivity due to old age, and sickness of family 
heads or economically active family members. 
Part III: Policies concerned with internal migration 
It is no exaggeration to say that in recent· times in Korea there have been no specific, 
explicit policy measures aimed at improving the well-being of urban inmigrants. The only 
explicit migration policy which has come into existence to date is a population dispersal 
policy. But its purpose is primarily to control the size of the Seoul population, and is far 
removed from any policy consideration in favor of the urban poor including recent inmig-
rants to Seoul. Speaking for the urban poor, the central and loca,l governments have shown 
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little concern for them at all. 
Off and on, local governments, in particular, the municipal governments of big cities have 
made nominal investments in low-cost housing construction for low income groups, squatter 
resettlement projects and wage-subsidy programs intended to provide subsistent income 
groups with minimum earnings. Even these welfare projects, primarily organized by the 
central government, however, have given priority to big cities rather than smaller-sized 
cities. Accordingly, they are often criticized by urban policy makers and academics who 
claim that these projects are explicitly or implicitly geared to attract rural outmigrants 
pushed toward big cities by the relatively declining rural economy. At any rate, there 
is little doubt that policy measures at any level of government that address the needs 
of the urban poor receive little attention among other priority policies. Why this is 
so can be answered through a brief review of the a planning process where the Seoul 
population dispersal plan was formulated. 
1. Seoul population dispersal plan in the national development strategy. 
Until recently, spatial policies including a migration policy have been given lower priority 
to an overriding sectoral approach seeking national economic development. No sooner had 
the so-called development decade of the sixties passed than the national economic policy 
orientation centered on growth maximization came under heavy pressure from the lagging 
regions. This brought the policy-makers and goverment planners to alter the previous policy 
course in such a way to take steps for regional equity, unless the latter would be detri-
mental to national efficiency. 
Accordingly, the national planners have been moved to define the modernization process 
of the national economy in terms of spatial dimension. Incidentally, social concern is gro-
wing over such conspicuously increasing urban diseconomies as traffic jams and urban 
pollution which are ascribed to the overcrowed population in the relatively tiny urbanized 
area of the nation. In this context, social awareness requires the social problems mentioned 
above to be defined in the spatial dimension. 
Thoughtful reflection on the previous development policy which was primarily concerned 
with the growth maximization of the national economy came to center on controlling the 
urban size of Seoul. The Seoul population dispersal plan was spelled out in early 1976. 
It should be noted that the population dispersal plan primarily aimed at (1) discouraging 
massive population movement from the countryside to Seoul, which witnessed an average 
rate of increase of 7.1% for the 15 years 1960"-'75, and, accordingly, has been subjected to 
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diminishing returns as the result of congestion and other urban deterioration; (2) diverting 
the future potential migration flow which would have been directed to Seoul to a few 
intermediatesized growth centers conceived as being in the stage of increasing marginal 
return with further population growth; (3) dispersing to the rest of the country development 
potential which would otherwise have been congested in Seoul at an increasing rate; and (4) 
attaining a more balanced spatial organization of the national economy than ever before, which 
would eventually bring about steady and continous growth rates of the national economy. (11) 
How to control the urban size or disperse the urban population is an immediate question 
to be answered by the government planning team. The dispersal plan was spelled out to 
contain two major objectives: one to discourage the ever-persisting migration wave into the 
Seoul metropolitan region; and the other to relocate a good portion of Seoulites to design-
ated local cities. 
It seems likely that the first target can be effecttively met by growth center policy. 
The adoption of growth center policy is encouraged by French regional planning experi-
ences which the government planners hardly failed to notice. France is noted for inventing 
the growth pole concept and is a forerunner in its policy application. Also, the French case 
is considered the most valuble and relevant lesson applicable to the current Korean situation 
on the grounds that both countries are suffering from growing spatial dualism. 
A French regional plan recommending the implementation of growth center policy is 
stated to point out that an estimated $ 12, 000 is needed to provide adequate urban services 
for each family newly migrating into the Paris region, whereas these costs could be reduced 
to $ 8,000, if the family would be diverted to medium-sized growth centers. Instead, if 
the migration flow toward Paris could not be decreased significantly, the French national 
economy might lose its relative advantage in competing with the other countries in the 
European Community (Sundquist, 1975). The point made by a French regional development 
authority is good enough to justify the valid applicability of a growth center policy to the 
Korean circumstances. 
As a result, five medium-sized cities with populations between 200, 000 and one million 
were designated as priority investment urban centers in 1978. Incidentally, these five 
growth centers have been observed to have increased rapidly in population due to their 
propulsive urban economies such as provincial administration centers and/or industrial 
complexes under the priority development projects of the central government. Rural outmig-
(11) The First Ministry without Portfolio, The Seoul Population Dispersal Plan, 1976. 
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rants who are mostly low-skilled, poorly educated and young have contributed to the 
population growth of these cities. In contrast, a selective migration stream appears more 
likely to move into Seoul where job competitiveness is so high as to discourage negative 
selective migration. 
Consequently, there increasingly appears to be a polarization between positive selective 
migrants who prefer Seoul, the primate city of Korea, and negative selective migrants who 
are destined to local mid-sized cities. This change in migration pattern provides a valid clue 
as to why urban riots took place in Pusan, the second largest city in Korea, and Masan, a 
newly bustling industrial city neighboring the former at the end of 1979. The social unrest 
was reportedly originated from a political issue in protest against the dictatorial rule of 
the incumbent political leadership. The rioters were joined by many low-skilled, youthful 
workers of rural origin. 
A prominent scholar is quoted as explaining that the urban riots which were sparked 
by political causes at first suddenly exploded from the frustration young, uprooted inmigr-
ants felt of new urban settings and lack of a sense of regional identity in their settlement 
places. He predicts that urban riots will occur more frequently, if appropriate policy 
measures aimed at improving the well-being of rural outmigrants are not taken. (12) 
On the other hand, a moderate view may be taken toward urban riots: it seems unlikely 
that urban rioters, if there are any in the future, comprised of many new comers to cities, 
would not turn out to be "the radical marginals", as defined by Nelson (1973) . It should 
be observed that they are as yet unorganized, and their level of socio-political awareness 
is low. Since low status and lack of contacts leave them more vulnerable to law and order, 
they are "particularly unlikely to choose aggressive political action to express their grievan-
" ces . 
Moreover, modern Korea has no ethnic segregation that might lead to urban disruption. 
Therefore, socio-cultural problems which Korea today encounters with the urban poor do 
not appear as complicated or hard to cope with, as found in, say, ethnically diverse 
countries. They may stem, at most, from economic hardship. To this extent, societal 
issues at stake surrounding the urban poor seem more susceptible to an en lighted economic 
policy weighted toward welfare considerations than to any other. In this sense, Korea 
(2) The point was made by Prof. Tai-joon Kwon, Dean of Graduate School of Environmental 
Studies, Seoul National University, who spoke of "Searching for National Goals in 1980' s" 
from the standpoint of urbanization and quality of the environment, at a seminar organized 
by the Korean Society for Future Studies. March 2, 1980. 
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enjoys a comparative advantage over ethnically complex developing countries in dealing 
with the urban poor. For this reason, however, there is the danger of the possibility that 
the urban poor in Korea might be given relatively little priority in pubic policy choices. 
A second objective of the government's dispersal policy has been to relocate a portion of 
the existing urban population of Seoul into designated local areas. But this policy goal is 
more difficult than that of discouraging a migration wave. To reduce the urban size by a 
certain proportion calls for simultaneous moves of prominent job opportunities and other 
attractive urban amenities which have pumped a great number of migrants into Seoul. In 
making this attempt, a reduction of urban land designated for manufacturing activities and 
extensive expansion of urban renewal projects within the administrative boundaries of Seoul 
are conceived as priority projects. Policy ideas also include plans to control polluting indus-
trial firms, which will be, if they move out beyond the boundaries of the city, rewarded 
by low-interest loans, tax-waivers and other fringe benefits. If undertaken as they are 
conceived, the policy measures would work toward cleaning up the urban environment and 
replacing more desirable urban land uses for manufacturing land use. 
Nevertheless, these plans are susceptible to the criticism that they work against the well-
being of low-income groups including recent inmigrants. They would be worse-off, because 
they would have to pay extra costs for either farther commuting distances to relocated job 
places beyond the municipal boundary or, if they were willing to make a residential relo-
cation, new housing accommodation costs plus moving expenses. An alternative possibility 
is for them to find job opportunities equivalent to or better than the jobs they hold pres-
ently within their current commuting distances. This option, however, would hardly 
apply to most of them, because of their low-skill and, accordingly, very limited choices 
within the job market. 
However, aside from the fact that low-income groups would be reluctant to move out of 
Seoul, manufacturing jobs, if any, recently relocated beyond the municipal boundary would 
be a good alterative choice for potential rural outmigrants intending to move into the Seoul 
metropolitan region. This contention explains why all the small and medium-sized cities 
neighboring to Seoul have recently shown an explosive population growth rate since the 
Seoul population dispersal policy was put into action. 
Regardless of welfare consideration from the standpoint of the urban poor, it would be 
difficult to determine how effective the policy objectives of population dispersal by means 
of the relocation of manufacturing activities would be, unless modern management sectorlS 
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would cease to concentrate in Seoul. As in many developing countries, urban jobs in Korea 
are hierarchically organized. Based on the urban employment structure model defined by 
Friedmann and Sullivan (1975), a urban job structure model (H-K.Kim,1976) is propose~ 
to discuss the possibilities and difficulties met in the Seoul population dispersal plan. The 
model is illustrated as follows: 
Decision-making sector 
of public and private 
organizations 
Modern organi-










The model reads that the job locations of lower sectors as defined in the hierarchical 
structures of urban jobs are greatly dependent upon their respective upper echelons of job 
sectors. For instance, service activities belonging to the traditional household sector such 
as mentioned earlier are desperate for accessibility to modern organization sectors including 
corporate firms and public management institutes. And street economy sectors are oriented 
primarily toward the modern organization sector and partly toward traditional household 
sectors in their locational behavior. If applied to the case of Seoul, manufacturing sectors 
planned to be moved out of Seoul would have been relocated as effectively as modern 
organization sectors and, if possible, the decision-making sectors of management activities 
would move from their present locations congested in Seoul, which is the site of control 
of both private and public sectors. 
The hierarchical relationship among various job sectors that the model refers to was 
seriously taken into account by the national spatial planner so that the effort to disperse 
the Seoul population resulted in a plan to establish a new capital city to which the office 
activities of the central government would move. At the moment, however, the new 
capital city under planning no longer receives political support due to an abrupt turn-over 
of political leadership in 1979. 
The policy-making process noticed in the Seoul population dispersal plan brings some 
points to ponder from the standpoint of the urban poor's and, probably, the urban inmig-
rants. First, the policy makers within the central government have little changed their 
on-going 'policy objective centered on growth maximization of the national economy, while 
leaving equity consideration as a second choice. This idea is often justified on the grounds 
that equity can be significantly achieved, only if the national economy grows sufficiently 
to allow for fair distribution among social groups and regions. Until then, equity conside-
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ration can be taken into account only to the extent that growth maximization is not dist-
urbed. In this context, growth center policy is conceived as the best policy option. 
Second, the policy judgement advocating the dispersal plan is based on the fact that 
Seoul is increasingly suffering from urban diseconomies with the continuing population 
growth mainly caused by urban inmigration. This argument presupposes the likelihood of 
optimum city size, and its corresponding policy-making facilitated by such an aggregate 
indicator as population growth rates which Seoul has shown since the early 1960's. Ne-
vertheless, it is not difficult to find that the policy judgement is based on a theory too 
poorly articulated to put forward to valid policy implications (Richardson, 1972). 
On the other hand, the population growth rate as a policy indicator is too aggregate to 
evaluate its outcomes, particularly from the vantage point of the urban poor. In a sense, 
the adoption of the indicator is based on the idea that higher social costs in Seoul might 
occur due to too fast a rate of inmigration relative to the increase in urban capacity. But 
this theory still remains as much unproved as optimun city size theory (Richardson, 1972). 
Furthermore, the indicator is certainly useless in identifying who benefits and who loses, 
if and when it is taken as a policy guide in regard to migration policy. To the contrary, 
a theoretical contention (Thompson, 1972) that rural outmigrants are better-off in all 
likelihood by their move to urban sectors of any size seems valid enough to assert that 
any urbanization policy aimed at reducing the volume of inmigrants destined to big cities 
is contrary to their welfare. Therefore, it is certain that the dispersal plan of the Seoul 
population seems more likely to be detrimental to the welfare of the urban poor, the 
recent inmigrants, and impoverished potential rural outmigrants. 
2. Squatter relocation policy 
As far as the well-being of urban inmigrants is concerned, squatter relocation policies 
deserve an enlightened discussion. In an effort to deal· with squatters in the late 1960's, the 
Seoul municipal government undertook an ambitious project aimed at the construction of 
a new town in an almost empty area 25Km south of Seoul. It was planned to accommo-
date a population of 350 thousand, of which about 70 per cent or 250 thousand were to 
be filled by squatters relocated by the city of Seoul. It was spelled out that the town would 
be built as a self-contained, self-supporting community, with specific provisions against 
becoming a bed town of Seoul. But the whole program was terminated at the end of 1971 
when the city grew to have a population of 160 thousand consisting of some 110 thousand 
relocated squatters. 
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Outcomes of the program turned out to be by no means satisfactory from the viewpoint 
of the poor's welfare. By the end of 1971, industries within the town employed only a 
total of 1320, which barely accounted for 10 per eent of the economically active labor 
force which amounted to 14,000 of the relocatees. Thereafter, 30 per cent or more of the 
relocated squatters moved out of the new town by reselling their lands alloted by the 
government, due largely to the very limited job market and partly to grossly inadequate 
development of urban infrastructures and community facilities there. Many of them again 
moved to the central city of Seoul where, with their low skills, they could find the best 
job opportunities. Meanwhile, many relocated squatters who still remain in the town 
have continued to seek job opportunities in Seoul and, if they succeed in getting a job, 
commute to Seoul for work. 
These outcomes may be evaluated from the standpoint of the urban poor's welfare. 
First, the resettlers from the new town served to make existing slum dwellings in the 
central city of Seoul even more over-crowded than before, for a considerable portion of 
squatter settlement areas had been demolished for the past few years by stringent govern-
ment control on new squatter dwellings. Thus, both the existing and newly resettled 
squatters became worse-off in finding slum housing adequate for their income status, despite 
the fact that job opportunities were more available for the latter. Second, commuters from 
the town to Seoul had to spend much more for transportation cost in terms of both money 
and time in a longer haul between work and home than before when they had worked 
and lived in the central city of Seoul. Increased transportation cost might result in a 
negative income effect on their small earnings_ Third, the longer haul by commuters, as 
mentioned above, might generate an additional social cost of traffic congestion in the 
central city. This side-effect should have been prevented for the benefit of all citizens in 
Seoul. The afore-mentioned discussion brings out the valuable lesson that squatter 
relocation policies are less likely to improve the poor's housing status, if the policy is not 
matched by necessary and sufficient considerations for the people's socio-economic 
welfare. 
3. Concluding remarks 
In summary, it can be concluded that the migration policy in the name of the Seoul 
population dispersal plan has no mention of the welfare of the urban poor as well as in-
migrants to Seoul. Also, relocation policies that have been attempted by the Seoul muni-
cipal government remain distant from attaining a policy goal favoring the urban poor. The 
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policies were carried out without any corresponding effort to improve income and/or em-
ployment status of the urban poor at the same time. There are many factors accounting 
for this failure. Among others, it seems attributable to planning styles predominant in 
Korea today. 
As for the population dispersal plan, the spatial planners are observed with pursuing 
the GNP maximization goal which is sectorally defined by the economic planners. The 
spatial planning style takes place in such a wa:y ~s to adapt itself to the national develop-
ment goal proposed by the sectoral planners. In due course, spatial plans on any scale 
remain at best supplementary to the sectoral approach of national development. 
As for Korean spatial planning practice, equity consideration is legitimated within the 
efficiency of the national economy. This is not to deny that it would be desirable to seek 
after, if possible, both policy goals at the same time. Nevertheless, the two development 
goals are usually characteristic of a trade-off relationship between each other. As the recent 
Korean case shows that spatial efficiency is preferred to equity considerations, the urban 
poor and new in migrants receive little attention from the spatial planners, as observed in 
the plan-making process of the disperal plan. 
Urban planners show themselves not to be free from shortcomings as shown in the 
sectoral planning styles. From time to time, they fall short of an acute awareness to make 
a distinction between a place's prosperity and the people's prosperity in their plan-making. 
A place's prosperity does not necessarily guarantee people's prosperity in the place. And 
people's prosperity differs within social groups. This welfare consideration should have 
been elaborated in the Seoul population dispersal plan. 
Likewise, migration flow affects the well-being of those people joined and left by the 
migrants in their destinations and origins, respectively. For this reason, the question of 
who loses and who benefits should be fully examined when migration policies such as 
population dispersal from a big city are put into effect. From the standpoint of the people 
of big cities joined by rural outmigrants, the former will have to pay additional social 
costs such as traffic jams and overurbanization of public services. As such, the recent mi-
gration policy in Korea falls short of comprehensive consideration in regard to the quality 
of life of those who move, who are left over, and who are joined. 
To put it differently, the planning practice mentioned above may be significantly asso-
ciated with a predominant research style in migration studies, as found in today's Korea. 
In many cases, migration studies attempt to explain the cause and effect of migration in 
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regard to urban and regional economies where people's move takes place. By employing 
regional econometric models which are aspatial in nature, the studies often move in such 
a way that net migration volume in a spatial economy is dependent upon differences of 
economic indicators such as wages, job opportunities, and incomes found in the destination 
and origin under study. This aggregate approach to migration study is too coarse to put 
forth policy implications valid enough to specify the impact of migratory flow on the 
concerned people. In this connection, almost all the migration studies dealing with Korean 
internal migration are poorly articulated from a theoretical perspective by taking the 
aggregate approach. 
Meanwhile, as Korea enters the new decade of the 1980's, time is drawing a little bit 
closer to expected changes of public policy style that will take into account welfare 
considerations to a more appropriate degree. The new tide in public policies may be attri 
buted to the turnover of political powers in 1979. A minor, but substantial change in policy 
style is found 'in that the 5-year economic development plan which has greatly contributed 
to rapid growth of the national economy will be renamed the "5-year socio-economic 
plan", beginning 1982. 
At this juncture, it might be worthy to mention that concerned people have .for a long 
time been advocating a balanced socio-economic development strategy over the overriding 
sectoral approach of national development which has persisted throughout the past two 
decades of the 1960's and 1970's. To this end, a research institute prepared a report13J 
paying greater attention to the role of social development in economic development strategy, 
at the request of the Economic Planning Board in charge of long- and short-term economic 
development plans. A number of priority policy measures were recommended in an effort to 
improve the quality ?f urban life. Such policies are (1) the development of urban land to 
meet its exploding demand; (2) the expansion of housing; (3) the provision of convenient 
and cheap mass transport; (4) an increase of piped water supply; and (5) improving solid 
and liquid waste treatment. 
But all these programs are implicitly directed at middle classes or above. Neither the 
urban poor, nor urban inmigrants are included in the target population. Even under these 
newly emerging circumstances where welfare considerations are taken into account to the 
same extent as an efficiency criteria in national development strategy, it is more than 
(13) Korea Development Institute, A Perspective Plan of Socio-Economic Development: 1977-91, 
Seoul, 1976. 
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necessary to specify cos,ts and benefits of public policy with special reference to the target 
population. At the same time, this effort should be matched by micro-scopic studies (14) on 
the quality of urban life. 
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